Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. Reminds Investors That Class Action Lawsuits Have Been Filed Against Olo, Centessa, PayPal, and Opendoor and Encourages Investors to Contact the Firm
November 27, 2022 at 20:55 PM EST
NEW YORK, Nov. 27, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been commenced on behalf of stockholders of Olo, Inc. (NYSE: OLO), Centessa Pharmaceuticals Plc (NASDAQ: CNTA), PayPal Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: PYPL), and Opendoor Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: OPEN). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about each case can be found at the link provided.
Olo, Inc. (NYSE: OLO)
Class Period: August 11, 2021 – August 11, 2022
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 28, 2022
Olo provides software to restaurants to assist with online ordering and food-delivery coordination. During the Class Period, the Company’s key business metric demonstrating its growth was its “active locations,” with each active location representing a unique restaurant location using an Olo product.
In February 2020, the Company announced a partnership with Subway® restaurants (“Subway”) to enable Subway’s more than 20,000 U.S.-based restaurants to handle digital orders from third-party “marketplaces” such as Uber Eats or DoorDash. Throughout the Class Period, Olo touted the growth of its active locations, with Subway accounting for approximately 20% of those locations. By the first quarter of 2022, the Company’s active locations had grown to approximately 82,000 – a 19% increase over the prior year.
The truth emerged on August 11, 2022, when the Company announced disappointing results for the second quarter of 2022, lowering revenue guidance and reporting that its active location count remained flat at 82,000. The Company explained that it was impacted by the loss of 2,500 Subway locations, due to Subway choosing to implement direct integration with marketplaces, and that the Company expected the remaining Subway locations would also end their contracts with Olo by the fourth quarter of 2022 or first quarter of 2023 – facts Defendants claimed to have incorporated into Olo’s guidance months earlier without informing the market. In response to this news, the price of Olo common stock declined approximately 36%, from a closing price of $12.99 per share on August 11, 2022, to a closing price of $8.26 per share on August 12, 2022.
The Class Action alleges that, during the Class Period, Defendants misled investors and/or failed to disclose that (1) Subway was ending its contract with Olo; (2) Olo’s key business metric – active locations – could not continue to grow as Defendants touted due to the loss of Subway’s business; and (3) that, as a result of the above, Defendants’ statements about Olo’s business, operations, and prospects were false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.
For more information on the Olo class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/OLO
Centessa Pharmaceuticals Plc (NASDAQ: CNTA)
Class Period: May 28, 2021 – June 1, 2022 or pursuant to the Company’s May 28, 2021 IPO
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 28, 2022
Centessa is a clinical-stage pharmaceutical company that purports to discover, develop, and deliver medicines to patients. The Company’s development pipeline includes, among other products, lixivaptan, a vasopressin V2 receptor small molecule inhibitor in Phase 3 clinical development for the treatment of autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (“ADPKD”); and ZF874, a small molecule pharmacological chaperone folding corrector of the Z variant of the DNA encoding protein alpha-1-antitrypsin (“A1AT”), which is in Phase 1 clinical development for the treatment of A1AT deficiency (“AATD”).
On April 21, 2021, Centessa filed a registration statement on Form S-1 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in connection with the IPO, which, after several amendments, was declared effective by the SEC on May 27, 2021 (the “Registration Statement”).
On or about May 28, 2021, Centessa conducted the IPO, issuing 16.5 million of its ADSs to the public at the Offering price of $20 per ADS, for proceeds of $306.9 million to the Company after expenses and applicable underwriting discounts.
On June 1, 2021, Centessa filed a prospectus on Form 424B4 with the SEC in connection with the IPO, which incorporated and formed part of the Registration Statement (the “Prospectus” and, collectively with the Registration Statement, the “Offering Documents”).
The complaint alleges that the Offering Documents were negligently prepared and, as a result, contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading and were not prepared in accordance with the rules and regulations governing their preparation. Additionally, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, the Offering Documents and Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) lixivaptan was less safe than Defendants had represented; (ii) Defendants overstated lixivaptan’s clinical and commercial prospects; (iii) ZF874 was less safe than Defendants had represented; (iv) Defendants overstated ZF874’s clinical and commercial prospects while downplaying the drug’s safety issues; and (v) as a result, the Offering Documents and the Company’s public statements throughout the Class Period were materially false and/or misleading and failed to state information required to be stated therein.
On November 1, 2021, Centessa issued a press release announcing results from the Phase 1 study evaluating ZF874 in treating AATD, including, among other results, potential safety issues related to increases in liver enzymes alanine aminotransferase (“ALT”) and aspartate aminotransferase (“AST”) in one of the study subjects.
On this news, Centessa’s ADS price fell $3.19 per share, or 18.55%, to close at $14.01 per share on November 1, 2021.
On June 2, 2022, Centessa issued a press release “announc[ing] that it has made the strategic decision to discontinue development of lixivaptan for [ADPKD,]” citing “a recent observation of [ALT] and [AST] elevations in one subject” from a Phase 3 study of lixivaptan that was designed to assess liver and non-liver safety in certain subjects.
On this news, Centessa’s ADS price fell $1.25 per share, or 27.78%, to close at $3.25 per share on June 2, 2022.
Then, on August 10, 2022, Centessa issued a press release “announc[ing] its decision to discontinue development of ZF874 following a recent report of an adverse event (AE) involving elevated liver enzymes (AST/ALT) in a . . . subject dosed with 5 mg/kg BID of ZF874 in the Phase 1 study.” Centessa stated that “[b]ased on the results observed to date, the Company concluded that ZF874 was unlikely to achieve the desired target product profile.”
On this news, Centessa’s ADS price fell $0.26 per share, or 5.19%, to close at $4.75 per share on August 10, 2022, representing a total decline of 76.25% from the $20.00 per ADS Offering price.
As of the time the complaint was filed, Centessa’s ADS price continues to trade significantly below the $20.00 per ADS Offering price, damaging investors.
For more information on the Centessa class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/CNTA
PayPal Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: PYPL)
Class Period: February 3, 2021 – February 1, 2022
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: December 5, 2022
The PayPal class action lawsuit alleges that PayPal throughout the Class Period touted the growth in its Net New Active Accounts (“NNAs”) and instructed investors to value the high growth in this metric as one of the most important indicators of how PayPal was performing.
But as the PayPal class action lawsuit alleges, while touting its NNA growth, PayPal failed to disclose that many of the additional users acquired through its cash account creation incentive campaigns were illusory because those incentive campaigns were easily susceptible to fraud. Specifically, PayPal failed to disclose that its cash incentive campaigns significantly increased PayPal’s susceptibility to bot farms that were able to systematically take advantage of PayPal’s $10.00 account opening by creating millions of illegitimate accounts, which ultimately generated no future revenue for PayPal. In addition, the PayPal class action lawsuit alleges that investors were unaware of the lengths PayPal was going to keep inactive customers and fake bot accounts on the platform to prevent churn and inflate its NNA guidance which would have provided a more realistic view of the true demand for PayPal’s platform.
On February 1, 2022, PayPal revealed that its NNAs were only 49 million for 2021, less than the guidance of 50 million it initially provided in February 2021. In doing so, PayPal admitted that “in connection with the increased use of [cash] incentive campaigns throughout 2021, [PayPal] identified 4.5 million accounts that [PayPal] believe[s] were illegitimately created,” and that as a result PayPal changed course on some of its customer acquisition strategies including incentive-led campaigns in the fourth quarter. Further, because PayPal was evolving its customer acquisition and engagement strategy, PayPal now expected only 15-20 million net new customer accounts for 2022 and that PayPal “no longer believe[s] that the 750 million medium-term account aspiration [PayPal] set last year is appropriate.”
On this news, PayPal’s stock price fell by approximately 25%, damaging investors.
For more information on the PayPal class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/PYPL
Opendoor Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: OPEN)
Class Period: December 21, 2020 – September 16, 2022 or pursuant to the Company’s December 21, 2020 IPO
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: December 6, 2022
Opendoor was formerly known as Social Capital Hedosophia Holdings Corp. II (“SCH”) and operated as a special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”), also called a blank-check company, which is a development stage company that has no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, other entity, or person.
On September 15, 2020, the Company, then still operating as SCH, and Legacy Opendoor, a private company operating as a digital platform for residential real estate, announced their entry into a definitive agreement for the Merger (the “Merger Agreement”), which valued Legacy Opendoor at an enterprise value of $4.8 billion.
On October 5, 2020, the Company filed a registration statement on Form S-4 with the SEC in connection with the Merger, which, after several amendments, was declared effective by the SEC on November 27, 2020 (the “Registration Statement”). On November 30, 2020, the Company filed a proxy statement/prospectus on Form 424B3 with the SEC in connection with the Merger, which formed part of the Registration Statement (the “Proxy” and, together with the Registration Statement, the “Offering Documents”).
On December 18, 2020, pursuant to the Merger Agreement, the Company, among other things, deregistered as a Cayman Islands company, registered as a Delaware company, changed its name to “Opendoor Technologies Inc.”, and consummated the Merger, whereby, among other things, Legacy Opendoor became a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company.
Following the Merger, the Company has operated a digital platform for buying and selling residential real estate in the U.S. The Company’s platform features a technology known as “iBuying,” which is an algorithm-based process that purportedly enables Opendoor to make accurate market-based offers to sellers for their homes, and then flip those homes to buyers for a profit.
On December 21, 2020, the Company’s post-Merger common stock and warrants began publicly trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market (“NASDAQ”) under the ticker symbols “OPEN” and “OPENW”, respectively.
On September 19, 2022, citing a review of industry data, Bloomberg reported that the Company appeared to have lost money on 42% of its transactions in August 2022 (as measured by the prices at which it bought and sold properties). Bloomberg further reported that the data was even worse in key markets such as Los Angeles, California, where Opendoor lost money on 55% of sales, and Phoenix, Arizona, where it lost money on 76% of sales. Worse, a global real estate tech strategist interviewed by Bloomberg, Mike DelPrete, predicted that, based on his analyses, September would likely be even worse for Opendoor than August. Bloomberg’s findings evidenced the failure of Opendoor’s algorithm to adjust accurately to changing market conditions.
Following the Bloomberg report, Opendoor’s stock price fell $0.50 per share, or 12,32%, over the following two trading sessions, to close at $3.56 per share on September 20, 2022 – an 88.61% decline from the Company’s first post-Merger closing stock price of $31.25 per share on December 21, 2020 (the “Initial Closing Price”).
As of the time the complaint was filed, Opendoor’s common stock was trading significantly below the Initial Closing Price and continues to trade below its initial value from the Merger, damaging investors.
According to the complaint, the Offering Documents for the Merger were negligently prepared and, as a result, contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading and were not prepared in accordance with the rules and regulations governing their preparation. Additionally, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, the Offering Documents and Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the algorithm (“Algorithm”) used by the Company to make offers for homes could not accurately adjust to changing house prices across different market conditions and economic cycles; (ii) as a result, the Company was at an increased risk of sustaining significant and repeated losses due to residential real estate pricing fluctuations; (iii) accordingly, Defendants overstated the purported benefits and competitive advantages of the Algorithm; and (iv) as a result, the Offering Documents and Defendants’ public statements throughout the Class Period were materially false and/or misleading and failed to state information required to be stated therein.
For more information on the Opendoor class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/OPEN
About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm represents individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal courts across the country. For more information about the firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.